Jun. 24, 2015

Verifying a Final Nuclear Deal with Iran – Olli Heinonen (Iran Task Force)

• Unfettered access to sites, facilities, material, equipment, people, and documents is imperative to the credible long-term verification of any nuclear agreement with Iran.
• This “anywhere, anytime” access and short notice inspections must not be subject to a dispute resolution mechanism which would delay the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access.
• Procedures in a final deal which provide Iran with the ability to define or control access, undermine the verifiability of the agreement and affect the IAEA’s ability to reach timely conclusions.
• Additionally, the resolution of the IAEA’s outstanding concerns regarding the possible military dimensions of Iran’s program must be resolved prior to the provision of substantial sanctions relief.The writer is former deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

See also Necessary Safeguards for a Final Deal with Iran – Eric Edelman and Dennis Ross (Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs)

• The IAEA brief for Iran would require wide-ranging inspections and safeguard authorities to certify that its expansive nuclear-related infrastructure – declared and possibly undeclared – is rolled back and unable to progress toward nuclear weapons capability.
• However, it is uncertain whether the potential monitoring and verification regime adumbrated in the White House factsheet would be remotely sufficient for this task.

  Amb. Eric Edelman is a former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Amb. Dennis Ross is a former special assistant to President Obama and National Security Council Senior Director.

(Click on the title of either article to see the whole article…Ed.)